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We use the Portuguese case to replicate the study of Fama & French (2002) regarding the 
capital structure and the connections between profitability, investments and volatility 
with dividends pay-out and leverage.  Our aim is to analyse the relation between capital 
structure, dividends and interests on equity, using the Portuguese companies traded on 
Euronext, for the period between 2003 and 2014. 
In this research we found evidence supporting that Portuguese companies share the 
predictions of Pecking Order and Trade-Off models. In some cases, the predictions are 
the same, and differ only regarding the motive, which is the case of: (1) profitability and 
dividends; (2) dividends and investments; (3) volatility and dividends.  When the models’ 
predictions are set differently, the main goal is to identify whether it behaves, or does not 
behave according to Pecking Order or Trade Off. For instance, Portuguese companies 
behave according to the Pecking Order model with regards to the relationship between 
leverage and profitability. There are also situations where it is necessary to observe 
beyond the simple model, i.e., to the complex pecking order model , in order to understand 
what happens to companies’ leverage with changes in investment opportunities. One of 
the others main conclusion is that the target dividends do not absorb short term variations 






Key – Words: Capital Structure; Dividends pay-out; Leverage; Trade Off; Pecking 
Order; Debt 
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This research is a complement of the previous literature on Corporate Finance, where 
firms’ Capital Structure has been widely discussed. This is an important issue, which has 
been addressed in different lines of thoughts. The two main lines of thoughts are divided 
between the one that identifies and defends an optimal level of capital structure (intern 
and extern), i.e., in order to minimize the total cost. The second line of thought explains 
that the value of companies is unaffected, independently of how companies are financed, 
invoking an inexistence of optimal capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). 
However, it is important to mention that the MM theory was developed under strong 
hypotheses, namely: (1) the non-existence of taxes; (2) no fees or transaction costs, and; 
(3) no restriction to the cost of default, in such a way that companies could increase their 
level of leverage without incurring obligations to pay dividends. This is obviously a 
theory which is centred on a perfect market hypothesis, where all the managers are driven 
to maximize the profit of shareholders. In spite of the fact that the MM theorem started 
without taxes, extensions were developed of situations with taxes. The Static Trade Off 
case states that companies have a leverage target, where the tax deductibility of interest 
payments is the benefit of getting leverage, and this encourages the use of debt. This gains 
more importance with the presence of a non-debt tax shield (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) 
and personal taxes (Miller, 1977). Regarding Pecking Order models (Myers, 1984), firms 
usually prefer internal funds instead of external funds. Both models include variables such 
as: costs of default; agencies’ costs; asymmetric information, and; market imperfections. 
Following this theme, and maintaining the importance of understanding how companies 
behave in the face of changes in some indicators of performance and health, this study 
follows Fama & French (2002), whose research focuses on how companies perform, 
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based on Pecking Order vs. Trade-Off. This particular study relies on testing how leverage 
and dividends pay-out react with changes in investment opportunities and profits in 
Portuguese companies. In order to understand these issues, this research is divided into 
three different testing hypotheses. The first hypothesis that is tested is whether the target 
of dividend pay-out ratio changes with: (1) investment; (2) profitability, and; (3) 
volatility. Secondly, whether target dividend pay-outs are adjusted to absorb short term 
variation of investments is tested. The next hypothesis is related to the leverage of 
companies. In this specific case, the aim is to understand whether Portuguese companies 
behave in line with the Pecking Order, or Trade Off predictions, i.e., by relating leverage 
with: (1) profitability; (2) investments opportunities; (3) volatility, and; (4) non debt tax 
shield. 
As a result of all of these testing hypotheses, it is possible, in a very superficial way, to 
identify some of the share predictions that are present in the literature with Portuguese 
companies. As an example, our predictions are in accordance with Fama and French 
(2002), examples being profitability and dividends and volatility and dividends.  
An interesting conclusion of this study concerns dividends and investments; where 
evidence was founded suggesting that shareholders are probably so levered, that they need 
dividends, even when this goes against the company’s interest.  
Evidence was also found that dividend pay-outs are not used to absorb short term 
variations in investment, as the speed of adjustment is lower than 1. 
The prediction regarding leverage and profitability is only in accordance with Pecking 
Order. On the other hand, there is evidence in this research that companies behave as 
predicted by the complex Pecking Order or Trade-Off model, for instance with regards to 
leverage and investment opportunities. 
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1. Literature review 
Modigliani & Miller (1958) developed a theory which states that in perfect capital 
markets, the composition of capital is irrelevant when they want to finance investments. 
They explain that it is the possibility that earnings and the risk of their underlying assets 
that define their market value, in other words, it is indifferent which method is chosen to 
finance their investments or dividends pay-out. However this theory is supported by 
strong assumptions of no taxes, no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, and that the 
cost of debt is the same for companies and investors alike, with no asymmetric 
information, and finally, that the EBIT1 is unaffected by the debt. In a simple view, this 
proposition is transmitted by a constant WACC2, even with variations in the capital 
structure. Maybe this example would be easier to understand in the case of a company 
that does not benefit from tax advantages by interest payments, and that the way that the 
firm financed itself is equal. Furthermore, when there are no variations or advantages 
from rising debt, a company's stock price remains the same. 
Nevertheless, we must take care that in the real world there are taxes and bankruptcy 
costs, and these affect a company's stock price, and that the MM theorem apply. That is 
why they included the effect of taxes and bankruptcy costs. When submitted according to 
Modigliani and Miller's Trade-Off Theory of Leverage, this model takes these two 
variables into account. This model explains the benefits of leverage on capital structure, 
until the optimal capital structure3 is attained. Controversy surrounds this example, now 
that a tax benefit from interest payments is identified. 
 
                                            
1 Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
3The optimal capital structure is when a firm attains the best debt to equity ratio and increases it to a 
maximum value by reducing the cost of capital to a minimum. 
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1.1 Trade-Off  
The Trade-Off theory is based on the concept of a company maximizing its value by 
reaching an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of an additional unit of debt. The 
same idea is used for dividends, where a company establishes a level dividend pay-out 
whereby the company maximizes its value. Before looking at the Trade-Off model in 
detail view, we must start inquiring as to why companies pay dividends. 
The literature presents some points of view that describe the causes that explain why 
companies pay out dividends. One of the reasons that is presented, is that dividends exist 
in order to hedge against risk investment-taking leading to bankruptcy, without giving the 
reserved assets to shareholders once they liquidate them in advance. The idea here is that 
investors prefer a lower value of constant payments, rather than the uncertainty of high 
and extraordinary amounts of pay-outs (Gordon, 1959), which is the Bird The Hand 
theory. However this justification is not valid if the dividends match the investment, if 
managers do not extract the company from possible risky investments. However, the 
literature presents more justification, for instance, that communication to investors, 
(Hakansson, 1982).  This author suggests that distributing dividends is a way of 
transmitting confidence to investors and of transmitting an image of the good state of the 
firm. Conversely, there are more effective methods which are even cheaper, whereby it 
is possible to provide more information in a detailed way. This idea of transmitting 
information is also valid when investors are not homogeneous, and when the market is 
incomplete. For these reasons, and because it does not show the projections of the firm in 
a detailed way, it is not possible to extract positive or negative congestions by changes in 
the amount of dividend pay-outs. Therefore, firms can contract external auditing services, 
preferably for a large audit, in order to provide a high quality of service, (DeAngelo, 
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1981). The act of contracting an audit company allows for the examination of a firm, and 
enables proof about the behaviour of the managers, including whether they have been 
truthful and whether what they transmit to the investors is the real scenario of the 
company. 
Another possible reason pointed out in this extensive literature is that dividends can be 
explained by considering the dividends receivers, i.e., by firstly dividing the receivers 
into two different groups. Next, the criteria of division are the tax payments, divided by 
the group that pays, and the group of those who do not pay taxes on dividends. For payers, 
the receivers prefer to obtain the same amount in a different form, for instance by capital 
gains (Miller & Scholes, 1978).  For the other group, it would be indifferent, as there are 
no costs with this option. Therefore, in the end, the question still remains - why do 
companies pay dividends? This is even more so, as other forms of paying shareholders 
exist, such as repurchase on the open market, which has been more frequent over the years 
in the USA, specifically since 1980. However, there is no clear idea of how firms choose 
how to pay their shareholders. Allen & Michaely (2003) have reason to believe that 
repurchase will be the dominant way of doing so. According to these authors, young or 
risky companies are more likely to repurchase shares than to pay dividends.  On the other 
hand, large and established companies pay out significant percentages of their earnings 
in dividends and in repurchasing shares. Another evidence stated by these authors is that, 
when companies have investments with a positive net present value, thee should not resort 
to repurchases. Nevertheless, if the net present value is low, and if the company has no 
need of cash, then a repurchase should be carried out. Following this line of thought is 
that when firms increase their investment, yet suffer asymmetric information, they should 
not pay dividends, which decreases the cost of the pay-out. One more theory that is 
defended by F. Allen and Michaely (2003), is that the pay out of dividends should be 
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accomplished once a year, instead of quarterly, and that investors are then attracted to a 
long run of capital gains, which would be capable of trading shares earlier to escape the 
ex-day, and consequently by the tax payments on the dividends. This strategy allows a 
reduction of administrative and transaction costs. Finally, the authors mention that which 
has already been stated, that managers should seek other less expensive ways of 
transmitting credibility.  
Easterbrook (1984) follows other path, which mentions that dividends keep firms in 
capital markets, and that for this reason, it is possible to control managers with lower 
costs.  Dividends are also used to influence financing polices, and this might be a valid 
reason for why firms use this outflow of cash and raise funds (issue stock, or new debt) 
at the same time.  
Furthermore, there is another relevant issue, which is understanding what happens if 
managers and shareholders have a conflicting interest with regards to pay-out policies. 
Next, Jensen & Meckling (1976) explain that if there is an increase of the pay-out amount, 
then managers have less responsibility and then reduce their caution. To counterbalance 
this situation, they give more attention to the capital markets, in order to increase their 
power on the organization again. In this sense, it is important to motivate managers to pay 
out cash, instead of wasting companies’ efficiency. Sometimes managers turn to debt. 
Jenson (1986) explains the benefits of debt to reduce agency costs, by stating that when 
debt increases, its cost increases as well, and thus managers try to achieve the optimum 
level of debt equity ratio. If they achieve this, then the firm has its value maximized, and 
the marginal costs of debt compensate the marginal benefits. However, this is a paradox 
of the first preposition defended by Modigliani-Miller (1958), as, according to this author, 
it is exactly the same if a company finances itself with equity or debt, within certain 
assumptions. 
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Regarding the relation of taxes and leverage, it is quite important to take a detailed look 
at what DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) presented. They carried out an extension of Miller, 
changing the existent model, as it was too sensitive with regards to changes of corporate 
tax policies. According to DeAngelo & Masulis (1980), there is a non-debt tax shield 4that 
should be included, such as depreciation and investment tax credit, which should be 
included in the model. In short, this new model requires more than one debt tax shield to 
attain an optimal level of leverage. Regarding this research, equilibrium of leverage is 
exclusive for each company, so it is important to include variables such as were 
mentioned beforehand, in order to define this. It is also stated that personal and corporate 
taxes are present in relative market prices. Another important component are bankruptcy 
costs, which must be considered if we want to extract the tax benefit that is related to 
leverage cost. One of the predictions of this model is that firms have debt-level that has a 
negative relation with the non-debt tax shield. The authors also mentioned that 
modifications in debt bring variations to a company’s valuation. Therefore, in a situation 
of equilibrium, relative market prices will involve the tax advantage for corporate debt 
financing. Should fiscal changes exist (reducing their amount) regarding policies related 
to non-debt tax shield, then this will be reflected by increases in the amount of debt that 
firms purchase. Finally, DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) explain that bankruptcy costs are 
negatively correlated to debt. This idea is also consistent with Brandley, Jarrel & Kim 
(1984), as they stated that the expected cost of financial necessities and the amount of 
non-debt tax shield are negatively related to the optimal level of leverage. It is also 
pointed out that in a situation where the costs of financial distress are non-trivial, changes 
in firms’ earnings and volatility will negatively influence the level of leverage. Another 
                                            
4 Non debt tax shield is a reduction in the taxable amount of a company, by applying deductions on non-
debt expenses. The deduction reduced in the taxable amount through the current year, or deferred income 
taxes on future years. 
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component which interferes with leverage in a negative way, is the intensity of R&D and 
publicity expenditure. Authors have also pronounced that a kind of perplexity exists, 
which finds a direct relation between firms’ leverage and the comparative amount of non-
debt tax shields. However, this goes against the previous literature, which defends the 
replacement of non-debt tax shield for debt tax shields.5 A possible explanation referred 
to by the authors, is that a non-debt tax shield has more influence on the openness of 
firms’ assets, as it infers safety assets and rising leverage ratios.  
With regards to taxes and the Trade-Off model, it is necessary to point out another 
relevant study, that of Miller & Scholes (1978). In this study, it was proved that 
shareholders’ welfare is also affected  by the increase or decrease in dividends, 
independent of the discrepancy of the tax treatment on capital gains and dividends.  
With regards to debt level and company size, there are some studies which are consistent 
with most of the existing theories, for example, that of Titman & Wessels (1988). One of 
the founded evidences on that study, is that debt level is inversely related to the size of 
the company. Small firms tend to have higher short-term debt and lower long-term debt 
ratios. They also suggested that this might be a consequence of the high cost that small 
companies face when they try to issue long-term financial instruments.  
Table II (Appendix - page 45) illustrates Trade-Off predictions. 
1.2 Pecking Order   
In order to explain the Pecking Order model, the study of Myers & Majluf, (1984) needs 
to be observed first. In this research, one of the big issues of these authors was how 
investment opportunities should be financed, as managers are the ones who possess more 
information (even more than shareholders). The other big question raised is whether it 
                                            
5 Debt tax shield is a reduction in the taxable amount of a company, by applying deductions through debt 
expenses. 
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might be preferable to pass up investment opportunities or the issuing of stock, when a 
company needs to be financed. 
According to the Myers (1984) model, managers possess better information in 
comparison to investors. Therefore, the main conclusion of this model is that for the 
company it is always better to start with risk-free debt, by issuing safer securities than 
risk. If a company needs to obtain external capital, then it should resort to bonds market, 
and if it want to increase equity, then it should do so by retention. 
According to Myers, situations may exist whereby it is preferable to renounce good 
investments, rather than issue risky securities in order to finance them. Or, for instance, 
firms may even accumulate financial slack, and they can do this by restricting the amount 
of dividend pay-outs, by saving assets that are easily sold, preserving borrowing power 
and simply by saving cash. Myers goes even further, by explaining that companies ought 
not to pay dividends if they need to recover cash by selling stocks or other securities risk. 
The author also explains that dividends are a tool for communicating with the market, and 
that dividends are high correlated with managers estimating the value of asset. Finally, it 
has been suggested in this study that, if stocks are issued to finance investments and 
managers have more information, then the price will fall. On the other hand, if  companies 
issue safe default risk free debt to finance investment, then the stock price will not 
decrease. In conclusion, what is possible to extract is that internal funds are preferable to 
external funds. 
Following on from what has already been stated in this research, studies have shown that 
in the USA, the percentage of firms paying out dividends has declined since 1978. In 
order to understand this phenomenon, Fama & French (2001) suggest that there are three 
main features which affect the decision to pay dividends, or not, which are: Profitability, 
Investment Opportunities, and; Size. In order to have a clear idea of how they influence 
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dividend payment, Fama and French divided companies into three different groups: Ex-
Payer; Never Paid, and; Dividend Payers. The first conclusion is that Ex-Payers have the 
lowest earnings and the lowest values of investment. Secondly, companies that Never 
Paid dividends are more profitable than the former payers, with a higher opportunity for 
growth. This group is the one that has greater investment and a higher ratio of Market 
value of Assets to their book value. Finally, Dividend Payers are the most profitable. 
Another suggestion raised in this study, is that, included amongst those that pay 
dividends, are those that have higher ratios, which tend to be larger and more profitable. 
On the other hand, small companies with higher values of investments have lower ratios 
of dividends. This behaviour is consistent with a reluctance for risk security, on account 
of the existence of asymmetric information problems or transaction costs. 
Following this explanation, the viewing of Table II (Appendix - page 45) is suggested, 
in order to obtain a better view from Pecking Order predictions. 
Ana Ferreira                      Capital Structure and Dividends                        19 
                Evidences from Portugal (2003-2014) 





2.1 Sample and analysed period 
The data was extracted from Bloomberg6, and is composed of Portuguese companies (see 
the detailed list in Appendix page 44 –Table I) which are traded on Euronext and have 
information available for the period of 2003 to 2014.  
2.2 Definition of variables 
Some of the variables need to be transformed. For volatility, investment opportunities and 
profitability proxies were carried out by an extension of Fama & French’s (2002) 
procedures.  
As for representation for profitability, three different indicators are used: (1) Earnings 
before Interest and Taxes, divided by the Total Assets; (2) Earnings before Interest, also 
divided by Total Assets; (3) Market Value of the firm, (which is represented by liabilities 
minus deferred taxes, and investment tax credit, plus preferred stocks, and plus market 
equity), divided by Total Assets, which characterises profitability and investment 
opportunities simultaneously. Investment opportunities is also represented by: (4) 
Variations in Assets, divided by Total Assets, and; (5) Research and Development also, 
divided by Assets. 
The proxy used for volatility is: (6) the Logarithm of the Assets, which is the size, 
representing the (inverse) probability of default. Finally, the representation of applied 
non-debt tax shield7 is: (7) Research and Development, and; (8) Depreciation Expense, 
both divided by Assets.  
                                            
6 http://www.bloomberg.com/europe 
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Due to the complexity of both variables and ratios, the following paragraphs show, step 
by step, their construction. It is also possible to observe them in a simpler manner in 
Table III, Table IV and Table V (Appendix - pages 47, 48 and 49). 
Table III presents the simple variables, i.e., items taken from the financial records, or a 
slightly altered variable. 
• At represents Total Assets at moment t, and At1 Total Assets at moment t+1; 
• dAt is the variation in Total Assets at moment t; 
• LN (At) is the ln of the Asset at moment t; 
• D is the variable which represents the value of Dividends; 
• Et is the Earnings before Interest for moment t, created by the subtraction of Tax 
Expenses on Earnings before interest and expenses, and Et1 at the same moment 
as t+1; 
• ETt is the Earnings before Interest and Taxes, which is constructed by the 
EBITDA, adding depreciation and amortization at moment t; 
• dEt is the variation, which is Earnings before Interest at moment t, minus its value 
at t-1; 
• dETt is the change in Earnings before Interest and Taxes of  t and t-1; 
• Met is Market Equity, which is the number of shares, multiplied by the number of 
shares at moment t;  
• Vt is the Market Value of the firm, at moment t, constructed by the subtraction of 
Deferred Taxes and Investments Tax Credit on Liabilities, followed by the 
addition of Preferred Stocks and Market Equity; 
• RDt represents R & D Expenditure at moment t; 
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• RDDt is a dummy variable, which takes the value 0, if there are R & D 
Expenditures, and the value of 1 otherwise; 
• Dt, which represents the value of Depreciation Expenses at moment t; 
• Lt is the Liabilities, which is the sum of Short and Long Term Debt; 
• NSt is the number of Shares Outstanding at moment t; 
• SPt represents Stock Price at moment t; 
• Dst is the Variation of The Stock Price, which is represented by; 
• Yt is the Variations of Market Capitalisation, which is the variation between 
moment t and t-1 of the Number of Shares, multiplied by the Stock Price; 
• BE is Book Equity, which is Total Assets minus Liabilities, plus Deferred Taxes 
and Investment Tax Credits, minus Preferred Stock. 
Table IV (Appendix - page 48) and Table V (Appendix - page 49) are the build ratios 
from a better short view, and the next paragraph shows their computation in a more 
detailed way: 
• ETtAt consists of the Division of Earnings before Interest and Taxes at moment t 
for Total Assets, at the same moment; 
• Et/At is Earnings before Interest at moment t, divided by Total Assets at moment 
t; 
• VtAt represents the Market Value of the Firm at moment t, divided by Total Assets 
at moment t;  
• dAtAt is the variable used to represent the Ratio of Variation of Total Assets 
between t-1, and t for the Total Assets at moment t; 
• RDtAt is the Division of R & D Expenditures at moment t by the Total Value Of 
Assets, also at moment t; 
Ana Ferreira                      Capital Structure and Dividends                        22 
                Evidences from Portugal (2003-2014) 




• DPtAt is the ratio that relates Depreciation Expenses with Total Assets at moment 
t; 
• LtVt represents the liabilities at moment t, divided by the Market Value of The 
Firm at moment t; 
• LtAt is Liabilities divided by Total assets. LAL is the variable applied to show the 
variations of Liability ratios to Total Assets of t+1 to t; 
• Dt1At1 represents the division of Dividends to Assets, both at moment t+1;  
• YA is the Variation of Market Capitalisation t+1, divided by Total Assets t; 
• Yt1At1 represents the ratio at moment t+1 of Stock Earnings to Total Assets;  
• DDA is the Variation of Dividend at moment t+1 to moment t, divided by Total 
Assets at moment t; 
• DA is the value of Dividends at moment t, divided by Total Assets for the next 
period; 
• dAA is composed by the Difference of Assets between t and t+1, divided by Total 
Assets at moment t+1; 
• BL is the division of Liabilities at moment t+1 by the Total Assets in the same 
period; 
• ML is Market Leverage at moment t+1, which is Liabilities at t+1, divided by the 
Market Value of the Firm at moment t; 
• Det is the Change of EBI for moment t+1;  
• DEA is the Change of EBI for moment t+1, divided by Total Assets at moment 
t+1; 
• DAA is the Variation of Total Assets between t and t-1, divided by Total Assets at 
t+1; 
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• BD is the Changes in Liabilities between t+1 and t, divided by Assets at t+1.
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2.3 Descriptive statistics 
305 observations exist for all variables and for all of them the mean is positive with the 
exception of dSPt, the Variation of Stock Price, and Yt, the Variation of Market 
Capitalisation at moment t.  
Some of the variables used for this study have negative minimum values, such as, D; Et; 
dEt; ETt; dETt; Q; BE; Dst;Yt; ETtAt; EtAt; dAtAt: Dt1; Yt1; Et1. Others have a 
minimum of zero, such as Met; RDt; RDDt; DPt; NSt; SPt; RDtAt and DPtAt. At, Vt, Lt, 
LNAt, VtAt, LtVt,LtAt, Lt1, Vt1, At1 took positive minimums. In fact, all of the variables 
have at least one positive value once the maximum values are all positive. A value of 1 
exists, on account of the variable being a RDDt dummy. The descriptive statistics can be 
observed in Table VI (Appendix - page 50). 
These variables have passed the test of multicollinearity heteroscedasticity, through the 
Matrix of correlation, and the Breusch-Pagan and Wald tests. The regressions used and 
the test made were performed by Stata.8  
2.4 Regressions  
2.4.1 The first Testing Hypothesis 
In this first testing hypothesis, the main objective of this study is to understand how 
dividends target pay-out changes with variations in profitability, investment 
opportunities, and leverage. Previous studies, such as that of Lintner (1956), have a model 
that explains how dividends behave, however, only for dividends as a function of the 
target pay-out (r), the current value after taxes profit ( Pit), and the last amount of 
dividends paid (Di(t-1), as shown in Equation 1. 
                                            
8 http://www.stata.com/d 
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𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑐𝑐)𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
In Lintner (1956), p.14 – 109 
 
For this reason, and since the aim is to understand how dividends react when they are a 
function of profitability, investment opportunities and leverage, one should follow Fama 
& French (2002), who developed another regression where the coefficient of the net profit 
is affected by other variables.   
Equation (2) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 =⁄ 𝑎𝑎0 +  (𝑎𝑎1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑉𝑉 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄ 𝑎𝑎1𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑎𝑎1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎1𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄  
+ 𝑎𝑎1𝑆𝑆 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎1𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1+ 𝑎𝑎1𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)  ×⁄  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 +⁄  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
 
In Fama & French (2002), p.10 
 
In Equation (2), it is possible to observe that the target pay-out and the consequences of 
the dividends are explained by profitability volatility and non-debt tax shield investment 
opportunities.   The regression used in this study is slightly different from that of Fama 
& French (2002), which finally excludes the variable that would have the multiplication 
of all estimated coefficient and the explanatory variables model as its coefficient. The 
regressions used for this test are the following: 
• Target book leverage 
Equation (3) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 =⁄ 𝑎𝑎0 +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄ 𝑎𝑎2 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑎𝑎3𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎4 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄  + 𝑎𝑎5 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝑎𝑎6 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄  𝑎𝑎7𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
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• Target market leverage 
Equation (4) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 =⁄ 𝑎𝑎0 +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄ 𝑎𝑎2 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑎𝑎3𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎4 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄  + 𝑎𝑎5 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝑎𝑎6 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄  𝑎𝑎7𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 +⁄  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
  
2.4.2 The second Testing Hypothesis 
At this point, the goal of this research is to understand whether the dividend pay-outs are 
adjusted to absorb short term variations in investments. Therefore, in order to have a 
regression that includes changes in dividends because variations around the target pay-
out make sense to return to Lintner’s (1956) adjusted model, shown in Equation (5).  
However, for the same reasons that were presented in Fama & French (2002), the 
impossibility of relating dividends with investments is shown in the equation, which turns 
out to be misleading in explaining the speed of adjustment to targets pay-out, taking into 
consideration that which we wish to understand. 
Equation (5) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎1𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
In Fama &French (2002), p.10 
 
For this reason, and in order to measure the speed of the adjustment of dividends to the 
supply of short term investment variations presented, such as in Fama & French (2002), 
as shown in Equation (6), which is a model created by Fama & MacBeth (1973). 
 
Equation (6) 
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄ = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
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In Fama & French (2002), p.15 
 
Equation (6) is one step ahead of Lintner (1956), as it allows for the average variation 
during the years, instead of only taking into consideration the normal variations of 
dividends to the target pay-out. However, according to Fama & French (2002), the targets 
of distribution and the speed are different for each company, and that is why they 
presented equation (7). 
Equation (7) 
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄
= 𝑎𝑎0 + (𝑎𝑎1𝑉𝑉 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎1𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎1𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑎𝑎1𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎1𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1) × 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1
+ (𝑎𝑎2 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑉𝑉 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑎𝑎2𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎2𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1) × 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
 
In Fama &French (2002), p.16 
 
Due to the lack of data in this research, only two variations of the equation (6) were used, 
instead of equation (7). Therefore the equations applied in this study are the following:  
• Market leverage 
Equation (8) 
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄
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• Book leverage  
Equation (9) 
(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄
= 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1
+ 𝑎𝑎4 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
2.4.3 The third Testing Hypothesis  
At this phase of the research, the focus is to understand the behaviour of leverage. In order 
to achieve this goal, similar regression to that of Fama & French (2002) is used. This 
regression relates Book and Market leverage, as both are a function of investment 
opportunities, profitability and volatility proxies. Using a regression with these variables, 
it is possible to understand whether companies in Portugal are more likely to behave 
according to the Pecking Order or the Trade-Off model, as profitability and investment 
opportunities proxies are used. With these tests it is also possible to observe whether 
companies use debt to absorb short term variations of earnings and investments. In order 
to construct the final regression, Equation 10 was used (Fama & French, 2002).  
Equation (10) 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄ = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑏𝑏6𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝑏𝑏7𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
In Fama &French (2002), p.18 
 
Two slightly different regressions are used for this study, which are the following: 
 
• Book Leverage 
Equation (11) 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄ = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖
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• Market Leverage 
Equation (12) 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖+1⁄ = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏4𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑏𝑏6𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 
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This section is divided among the three main testing hypotheses. The first and the third 
hypothesis are divided into subsections. The section devoted to the first testing hypothesis 
is divided between the relationship between dividends and: (1) investment; (2) 
profitability, and; (3) volatility. These relationships can be interpreted in Table VII - 
(Appendix – page 51).  In the third hypothesis, the subsection shows the relations between 
leverage and: (1) profitability; (2) investments opportunities; (3) volatility, and; (4) non 
debt tax shield.  For this, Table IX - (Appendix – page 53) is used. The second hypothesis 
is not divided into subsections, and Table VIII - (Appendix – page 54) is used to describe 
it. 
3.1 First Testing Hypothesis 
In order to understand how dividends target pay-out changes with variations of 
profitability, investments and leverage, Table VII - (Appendix – page 51) shows the cross 
section regression of Yt1At1on Dt1At1. There is a low value on R-squared of 0.0072 and 
adding intersection terms increases the R-squared to values between 0.2980 and 0.3126.   
3.1.1 The relationship between Dividends and Investment: RDtAt 
Both Trade-Off and Pecking Order models state that higher investments are negatively-
related with dividend pay-outs. In the Trade-Off model, the justification for the behaviour 
is that companies try to avoid problems of underinvesting or not, as they do not want to 
use risky debt. For the Pecking Order model, the reason for the negative relationship is 
the fact that companies want to save debt capacity (with low risk) for future investments. 
As one of the proxies for investments opportunities is the RDtAt variable (5), the expected 
sign would be a negative one, as companies dispend more resources on R&D and are thus 
limited in distributing dividends. However, RDtAt, is not statistically significant, and 
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therefore it is not possible to make any inference.  
For the second investment proxy, dAtAt (3), the expected sign is also negative, as a result 
of positive changes in total assets when companies channel their resources to growth and     
consequently there is less cash available to be distributed. However, once again, nothing 
can be stated, as this is not statistically significant. 
Finally, with regards to the last investment proxy, that of VtAt (1), which is the market 
value of firm t to total assets, the coefficients are statistically significant and they have a 
positive relationship to dividend pay-outs.  However this contradicts the prediction that 
investment has negative effects on dividend distribution.  
Although RDDt (4) is not a proxy, it is a dummy, which assumes a value of 0 if there 
were R&D expenses, and 1 if there were none. This is statistically significant, and is 
consistent with the last conclusion. The main inference in this subsection is that 
Portuguese companies finance investments with debt, avoiding dividend pay-outs. The 
evidence found suggests that shareholders were probably so levered that they needed to 
receive dividends, even when this goes against the companies’ interest.  
3.1.2 The relationship between Dividends and Profitability Et/At; Vt/At 
Both models rely on the prediction that profitable companies pay out more dividends. 
According to the Pecking Order model, companies with more profits have more capacity 
to pay out higher values of dividends and maintain the possibility of recovering a low risk 
of debt as a means of financing investment opportunities. On the other hand, the Trade-
Off model points out that paying out dividends will control the agency costs created by 
cash flows. Besides these differing motives, both agree that profitability is positively 
related to dividend pay-outs, and thus one would be expected that the investments proxies 
are positive.  
One of the proxies for profitability is Et/At (2), which is statistically significant. With 
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regards the other proxy of profitability Vt/At (1), it is also statistically significant in all 
the regressions of the Table VII (Appendix – page 51). Both the variables have positive 
coefficients which is consistent with previous literature. Companies with more 
profitability have higher dividend pay-outs.   
3.1.3 The relationship between Dividends and Volatility: ln(At) 
Concerning volatility, we find the same predictions for both models, although, once again, 
for different reasons. The Trade-Off points are a reason for more volatile companies 
having lower pay-out values than safe companies, due to the fact that they have higher 
expected bankruptcy costs and consequently less leverage, and also that they finally pay 
out less dividends. Regarding the Pecking Order model, the purpose is related with the 
fear of having difficulty raising low risk debt. This variable ln(At) (6) is statistically 
significant and consistent (smaller companies have higher volatilities), and thus smaller 
companies will pay outs less dividends. This conclusion is in accordance with that found 
by Fama & French (2002).  
3.2 Second Testing Hypothesis 
The objective at this stage is to understand whether the targeted dividend pay-outs are 
adjusted to absorb the short term variation of investments and to examine whether firms 
vary dividend pay-outs in relation to targets to accommodate short term variations in 
investments. As Fama & French (2002) stated, Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustments model 
cannot be used, which includes normal variations in dividends due to movements toward 
the target pay-out.  For these causes, a dynamic model is used, which is the augmented 
Lintner model, which permits different means of variables over the years. According to 
Lintner (1956), different target pay-out and adjustments rates exist, whereby each 
company has different goals, experiences and paths. Companies might prefer growth 
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prospects of an industry or the company, or may prefer to satisfy requirements for internal 
funding. Despite these worries, managers and stakeholders show preference for 
stabilizing fluctuations of dividend rates, by using outside debt and new equity. Some 
companies compare the speed of adjustment to the most competitive firms.  
For this hypothesis, i.e., to test whether target dividend pay-outs are adjusted to absorb 
the short term variation of investments, and also whether firms vary dividend pay-outs 
from their targets in order to accommodate short term variations in investments, Table 
VIII (Appendix – page 53) is used, where the independent variable is the DDA, which 
equates to the variations of the dividends divided by the assets. The variable TP (7) 
presented on this table is the Target Pay-Out, which is YA (1) divided by speed of 
adjustment - SOA (6). When compared to the R-squared for all regressions, this one is 
situated in an interval of 0.21 to 0.24.  
The mean slope of DAA (3) permits a test of how dividends respond to changes of short 
term variations in investment. With regards to the speed of adjustment (SOA), which is 
the symmetric of the average slope DA (2), this is between 0.44 and 0.53. The coefficients 
are greater than that which is presented by Fama & French (2002), which lie between 0.27 
and 0.33. All standard errors of SOA (6) are higher than 1.96, and thus they are 
statistically significant. Regarding TP (7), target pay-out, we report a negative value and 
also small positive values. This occurs due to the importance of dividends being replaced 
by repurchasing shares, such as occurred in the US since 1980, according to Allen & 
Michaelly (2003). However this equation should be replaced by another one which allows 
changes in slopes of YA (1) and DA (2) in order to gain a clear idea of what happens 
when proxies for volatilities, profitability and investments opportunities change. At this 
moment, the only conclusion that can be made is that none of the coefficients of YA (1) 
are statistically significant. Concerning DA (2), the coefficients are all negative, and 
Ana Ferreira                      Capital Structure and Dividends                        34 
                Evidences from Portugal (2003-2014) 




simultaneously are all statistically significant. With regards to the main question, it is 
possible to say that target dividends do not absorb short term variations of investment, as 
the SOA and DA are not large enough to accomplish a total short term variation. 
3.3 Third Testing Hypothesis 
In order to explain the performance leverage, two different measures of leverage are used, 
the Book and the Market Leverage. For this test hypothesis, it is necessary to resort to 
Table IX (Appendix –page 54), which include proxies for investment opportunities 
leverage VtAt (1), and profitability EtAt (2). The R-squared for Book Leverage regression 
assumes the value of 0.56, and for Market Leverage, a value of 0.29. 
3.3.1 The relationship between Leverage and Profitability VtAt(1) EtAt(2) 
In order to relate Leverage with Profitability, we start with VtAt (1), which is a proxy for 
profitability, and the signs differ for Book and Market Leverage. However, in both cases, 
they are statistically significant. The coefficient of Book Leverage is negative, and its 
standard error is -13.6. On the other hand, VtAt (1) is positive when used to explain 
market leverage, and assumes a standard error of 5.16. 
EtAt (2) is also used as a proxy for profitability, assuming negative values for both Market 
and Book Leverage. In both cases, EtAt is statistically significant at 5%, and the standard 
error is closest to zero, with a value of -8.34. This is consistent with the Pecking Order 
prediction, showing that earnings have opposite effects on long and short term leverage. 
Other authors stated that more profitable companies have less leverage, such as Rajan & 
Zingales (1995), or Harris & Raviv (1991), who state that leverage tends to increase with 
non-debt tax shields, potential investments, and company size. On the other hand, 
leverage tends to decrease with risk, probability of bankruptcy and profitability. This can 
be easily understood in an example provided by Harris & Raviv (1991, 38): 
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If in the short run, dividends and investments are fixed, and if debt financing 
is the dominant mode of external financing, then changes in profitability will 
be negatively correlated with changes in leverage. 
    In Harris & Raviv (1991), p. 38. 
Harris & Raviv (1991) studied this behaviour for several countries. Using these results, 
and when confronted with their results, we can state that Portuguese companies behave 
similarly to firms in Japan, Italy, and Canada, and to the opposite of ones in the United 
Kingdom. These authors found evidence against the static Trade-Off model, which states 
that more profitable firms should have a higher optimal leverage level. However, 
extensions of the static Trade-Off theory exist, which state that the negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage ratios is in fact consistent with the Trade-Off theory. 
Following Strebulaev’s (2003) train of thought that companies are not constantly 
adjusting their leverage ratios, on account of transaction costs, companies permit that 
leverage ratios vary to an interval of values close to the optimal target ratios. For this 
reason, according to Long Chen & Xinlei Zhao (2005), the market equity values of 
profitable firms grow faster, leading to the inverse behaviour between profitability and 
leverage ratios. However, sometimes target companies have to resort to external funds. 
Thus the negative connection of profitability and leverage ratio might occur on account 
of firms moving away from their target ratios in the short term. 
Another possible explanation of the negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability is related to the so-called dynamic tax consideration, which proposes that 
internal funds are less costly than external ones, and for that reason are less attractive, 
although they permit delaying tax payments. Based on these causes, it is more likely that 
more profitable firms choose less debt and thus have lower target ratios.  
The evidence presented is consistent with the Pecking Order predictions, i.e., that 
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companies choose internal funds before raising debt, trying to escape from adverse 
selection costs.  
More profitable firms raise less debt, as they have more internal funds to rely on. The 
negative inverse connection between profitability and leverage might transmits the idea 
of a tax benefit, which is also a worry. 
3.3.2 The relationship between Leverage and Investment Opportunities RD/At (5), 
RDDt(4) 
Sometimes, shareholder problems attract situations of inefficient assets substitution- or 
even under-investment. To oppose this situation, incentives are given to companies that 
have more investment opportunities, the consequence being that few are under-leveraged. 
Another reason for the negative relationship between leverage and investment 
opportunities, according to the Trade-Off model, is the fact that firms can be more flexible 
towards debt payments as a means of controlling free cashflow problems. Finally, 
according to Myers (1977), companies with higher levels of leverage are more willing to 
let profitable investment opportunities pass by, than those with lower levels.   
However, as can be observed in Table-3, nothing can be said about the relationship 
between RD/At (5) for both Book and Market Leverage, as the highest absolute value for 
standard error presented is only 1.47, and thus they are not statistically significant. 
Another variable that is not statistically significant and which is not interpretable is RDDt 
(4)  
3.3.3 The relationship between Leverage and Volatility ln(At) (6) 
Regarding the relationship between Book Leverage and Volatility ln(At) (6), it is not 
possible to surmise any type of inference, as this variable is not statistically significant 
(BL regression). On the other hand, concerning the relationship between Market Leverage 
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and Volatility ln(At) (6), it is possible to make some conclusions, as the coefficient is 
statistically significant (ML regression). The evidences found is that they have a negative 
relationship, which is consistent with the complex Pecking Order model. A possible 
explanation was presented by Fama & French (2002), in that large companies have more 
ready access to debt market, with lesser costs.  
3.3.4 The relationship between Leverage and Non-Debt Tax Shield RDt/At (5) DP/At 
(3) 
As has already been stated, RDt/At (5) and DPt/At (3) are not statistically significant, 
which is consistent with Graham (1996), who states that RDt/At (5) and DPt/At (3) in the 
best case are the weak part when determining the tax rate of firms. 
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This study helps to understand how Portuguese companies react with regards to their pay-
out policy and leverage when they suffer changes on their capital structure and polices. It 
must be borne in mind that this is a very controversial subject, which has been studied for 
decades. To achieve the results, a replication of the methodology made by Fama & French 
(2002) was applied, in which both Trade-Off and Pecking Order were tested.  The 
regressions used were similar, or identical to those of Fama & French. It is now possible 
to state that Portuguese companies experience situations in which they behave in 
accordance with Pecking Order or Trade-Off, and, in some cases, with both of these 
models. As has been showed before, the literature states that both models share 
predictions in some occasions, however this happens for different reasons. The 
predictions of profitability and dividends are in agreement with the two models. The 
evidence found shows that higher profits result in a higher pay-out of dividends, 
independent of the underlying theory, whether it be Trade-Off or Pecking Order. This 
conclusion is also shared by Fama & French (2002)  
Regarding the prediction of dividends and investments, two different situations were in 
evidence. However, before going into detail, we would like to recall that the prediction 
in this case is common to both the Trade-Off and Pecking Order model, which states that 
companies with a greater value of investments have lower dividends. The first situation 
is that not all of the used proxies were statistically significant, such as, for instance, RDDt 
(which takes the value 0 if there is R & D expenditure, and the value 1 otherwise) and 
dAtAt, (variation of assets). The second situation concerns Vt/At, which contradicts the 
previous literature, such as the research of Fama and French 2002. The main conclusion 
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here is that shareholders are probably so leveraged that they are require dividends, even 
when this goes against the company’s interest. 
Another common prediction of those two models regards volatility and dividends, 
although from different causes. The prediction is that more volatile companies have lower 
pay-out values than safe companies. This is in accordance with this research, as the size 
of the company (the proxy for volatility being the smaller the company, the higher the 
volatility) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the regressions. We 
would also like to emphasize that this conclusion is in agreement with the conclusions of 
Fama & French (2002). 
Regarding the behaviour of target dividend pay-outs, the main question was to know 
whether they are adjusted to absorb short term variations of investments. With regards to 
this, we can say that target dividends do not absorb short term variations of investment. 
Even with values higher than those that were presented by Fama and French 2002 are in 
evidence, the speed of adjustment is not big enough to bring about a total short term 
variation. 
Moving to Leverage and Profitability, the prediction of the Pecking Order model and the 
Trade-Off one differ, once, as in the first one, is expected that companies with more 
profits have lower leverage (market and book leverage). However, the prediction of the 
simple Trade-Off model suggests that profitable companies have higher book leverage.  
Regarding market leverage, there is no prediction for Trade-Off, as market values 
increase with profitability. The conclusion is that both of the proxies used for profitability 
(VtAt and EtAt) are consistent with Pecking Order when they are used to explain book 
leverage, as they have a negative sign. Regarding market leverage, the Pecking Order 
prediction fails, as one of the proxies is positive. Therefore the conclusion is that there is 
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evidence that Portuguese companies with high profitability have lower levels of short and 
long term book leverage.  
With regards to Leverage and Investment Opportunities, we would highlight the need to 
distinguish between the two variants of the Pecking Order model - the simple and the 
complex. Concerning the simple PO model and market leverage, there are no predictions; 
and concerning the simple PO and the BL, a positive relationship is expected. On the 
other hand, the complex Pecking Order model states a negative relationship. Therefore, 
the larger the expected investment, the less will be the current Book or Market Leverage. 
From the Trade-Off theory, the prediction is that the higher the investments opportunity, 
the less will be the Book or Market Leverage. However, this study does not come to any 
conclusions about this point, as the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
With regards to the relationship between Leverage and Volatility through the Complex 
Pecking Order model or the Trade Off one, the relationship is negative, i.e., the higher 
the volatility, the less will be the leverage. Evidence found in this study is in accord with 
the previous literature, in that companies with more volatility of net cash flow have less 
book leverage. Regarding Market Leverage, it is not possible to make any inference, as 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
There are no statements regarding non-debt tax shield and its relationship with leverage, 
as the coefficients were not statistically significant.  
One of the limitations of this research is the reduced number of companies used in the 
sample, so it would thus be very interesting to carry out this research not only for 
Portuguese cases, but as well for the whole European zone, and also to carry out an 
analysis by sector. In this way, it would be possible for companies to have different 
behaviours, according their sector.  
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Table I - Population of the study - list of Companies.  
VAA Vista Alegre Atlantis SGPS (VAFK PL) 
VAA Vista Alegre Atlantis SGPS (VAF PL) - By Segment 
SAG GEST-Solucoes Automovel Globais SGPS SA (SVA PL) 
Sonae Industria SGPS SA (PL) 
Sonae Capital SGPS SA (SONC PL) 
Sonae SGPS SA (SON PL)  
Sonaecom - SGPS SA (SNC PL)  
Semapa-Sociedade de Investimento e Gestao (SEM PL) 
SDC - Investimentos SGPS SA (SDCAE PL) 
SDC - Investimentos SGPS SA (SDCP PL) 
Toyota Caetano Portugal SA (SCT PL) 
REN - Redes Energeticas Nacionais SGPS SA (RENE PL)  
Reditus-SGPS SA (RED PL)  
Portugal Telecom SGPS SA (PTC PL) 
Portucel SA (PTI PL) 
Sociedade Comercial Orey Antunes SA (ORE PL)  
NOS SGPS (NOS PL)  
Novabase SGPS SA (NBA PL)  
Mota-Engil SGPS SA (EGL PL) 
Grupo Media Capital SGPS (MCP PL) 
Martifer SGPS SA (MAR PL) 
Lisgrafica Impresso & Artes (LIG PL)  
Jeronimo Martins SGPS SA (JMT PL)  
Impresa SGPS SA (IPR PL 
INAPA - Investimentos Participacoes e Gestao SA (INA PL) 
Impresa SGPS SA (IPR PL) 
Ibersol SGPS SA (IBS PL)  
Imobiliaria Construtora Grao-Para SA (GPA PL) 
Global Intelligent Technologies SGPS S.A. (GLINT PL)  
Galp Energia SGPS SA (GALP PL) 
Futebol Clube Do Porto (FCP PL) 
F. Ramada Investimentos SGPS SA (RAM PL) 
Estoril Sol SGPS SA (ESON PL)  
Estoril Sol SGPS SA (ESO PL) 
EDP Renovaveis SA (EDPR PL) 
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA (EDP PL) 
Corticeira Amorim SGPS SA (COR PL)  
Compta-Equipamento e Servicos de Informatica SA (COMAE PL)  
Cofina SGPS SA (CFN PL) 
CIMPOR Cimentos de Portugal SGPS SA (CPR PL) 
Sport Lisboa e Benfica-Futebol SAD (SLBEN PL) 
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Table II - Pecking Order vs Trade-Off Predictions 
Source: Author´s construction, based on the previous literature 
Predictions Pecking Order Trade-Off 
Financing 
Companies will always choose the least 
expensive method of financing the 
company. Companies choose how to 
finance themselves through: 
1. retained earnings 
2. safe debt 
3. risky debt 
4. equity 
 
Dividend and leverage 
decisions are based on a Trade-
Off between a number of costs 
and benefits. The predictions 
are organized by four stages: 
• bankruptcy costs 
• taxes 
• free cash flow agency 
problems 
• stockholder/bondhol





Firms with higher ratios of investment to 
earning have less dividend distribution. 
Firms with more investments 




With higher profitability ratios, 
companies have more dividend pay-
outs. 
With higher profitability ratios, 





Larger companies have less volatility 
and higher pay-outs 
Volatile companies have lower 
pay-out values than safe 
companies. 
Dividends and 
Leverage Higher leverage, less dividend pay-outs. 
The higher the leverage (Book 




Complex Pecking Order- Companies 
with more-volatile earnings have less 
current debt (Book or Market Leverage). 
Companies with more-volatile 
earnings should carry less debt. 
Profitability and 
Leverage 
More-profitable companies will have 
lower leverage. 
Book Leverage: A Positive 
Relation between Book 
Leverage and Profitability. 
 
Market Leverage: No 
prediction, between Market 
Leverage and Profitability 
because Market Value 









Companies with higher levels 
of non-debt tax deductions 
(depreciation and research 
expenses) have lower leverage. 
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Predictions Pecking Order Trade-Off 
Leverage and 
Investments 
Simple Pecking Order: 
 
Book Leverage: Higher investment, 
higher Book Leverage 
 
Market Leverage: No prediction 
 
Complex Pecking Order 
 
Book Leverage: Larger expected 
investment, less current leverage. 
 
Market Leverage: Larger expected 




Negative relation between 
Book Leverage and Investment 
Opportunity.* 
Market Leverage: 
Negative relation between 
Leverage and Investment 
Opportunity.* 
Target leverage 
Does not have obvious leverage targets. 
However dividends are inelastic, and 
thus short-term variations in earnings or 
investments are presumed to be by 
incorporation of variations of leverage. 
Companies have leverage 
targets and that the level of 
leverage is mean, reverting 
around this target. 
*Depends if the debt capacity is a function of Book or Market Assets. 
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Table III - Variables Description 
Source: Author’s constructions, based on Fama and French (2002) 
Variable's Name Variable Formula 
Total asset  at t moment At Short term Asset t + Long term Assets t 
Changes on Total Asset at moment t DAt Asset t – Asset t-1 
Dividends at t moment D Value of dividend   
Earnings before interest at moment t Et EBIT-Tax expenses 
Changes of EBI at  moment t DEt EBIt-EBIt-1 
Earnings before interest and taxes at  moment t ETt EBITDA - Depreciations and Amortizations 
Changes of EBIT at moment t DETt EBITt-EBITt-1 
Market Equity at moment t Met Number of shares t  * Stock Price t 
Market value of Firm at moment t Vt Liabilities  – deferred taxes and investments tax credit + preferred stocks + market equity 
R & D Expenditures at moment t RDt Value of R & D Expenditures 
Dummy of R & D Expenditures at moment t RDDt Takes the value 0 if there is R & D Expenditures and the value 1 otherwise 
Depreciation Expense at moment t DPt Value of Depreciations 
Liabilities at moment t Lt Short term debt t+ long term debt t 
Number of shares outstanding at moment t NSt Number of Shares  
Stock price at moment t SPt Value of stock Price 
LN(asset) at  moment t Ln(At) Logarithm of the Asset´s Value  
Book Equity at moment t BE Value of Book Equity  
Variations of Stock Price at moment t DSPt Stock Price t - Stock Price t-1 
Variation of Market Capitalization at moment t Yt (Number of shares t  * Stock Price t) – (Number of shares t-1 * Stock Price t-1) 
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Table IV - Proxies  
Source: Author’s constructions, based on Fama and French (2002) 
Proxies Variable's Name Variable Formula 
Profitability 
Earnings before interest and taxes t / total assets t. ETtAt ETt/At 
Earnings before interest t / total assets t. EtAt Et/At 
Market value of firm t / total assets t. VtAt Vt/At 
Non-debt tax Shield 
R & D expenditures t / value of assets t. RdtAt RDt/At 
Depreciations expenses t / total assets t. DPtAt DPt/At 
Investment opportunities 
Earnings before interest t / total assets t. EtAt Et/At 
Market value of Firm t / total assets t. VtAt Vt/At 
(Total assets t - total assets between t-1) / total assets t. dAtAt dAt/At 
R & D expenditures t / value of assets t. RdtAt RDt/At 
  
Ana Ferreira                      Capital Structure and Dividends                        49 
                Evidences from Portugal (2003-2014) 




Table V - Ratios 
























Variable's Name Variable Formula 
Market Leverage at moment t. LtVt Lt/Vt 
Book Leverage at moment t LtAt Lt/At 
Dividends t+1/ total Assets t+1 Dt1At1 Dt1/At1 
Variation of Market Capitalization t+1/ total Assets t+1 Yt1At1 Yt1/At1 
(Dividends t+1 – Dividends t)/ total Assets t+1 DDA (Dt1 - Dt)/At1 
Dividends t/ total Assets t+1 Dt/At1 DA Dt/At1 
(Total Asset t+1 – total Assets t)/ total Assets t+1 (At1 - At)/At1 Daa (At1 - At)/At1 
Variation of Market Capitalization t+1/ total Assets t YA Yt1/ At 
Target Book leverage moment t+1 BL Liabilities t+1/ total Assets t+1 
Target Market leverage moment t+1 ML Liabilities t+1/ Market value of Firm t 
Variation of Liabilities to assets ratio between t+1 and t LAL Lt1/At1 -  LtAt 
Changes of EBI moment t+1 Det Et+1 – Et 
Changes of EBI moment t+1 divided by total assets on moment t +1 DEA (Et+1 – Et )/At+1 
Changes of Total between t and t-1t to Total assets t+1 DAA dAt/At1 
Liabilities t+1/market value of the firm t+1-Liabilities t/market value of the firm t ML2 Lt1/Vt1 -  Lt/Vt 
(Liabilities t+1- Liabilities t)/ assets t+1 BD (Lt1 - Lt)/At1 
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Table VI - Descriptive statistics 
Source: Author’s constructions, based on the Bloomberg database. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
At 305 3027.496 6491.339 23.92754 42627.84 
Dat 305 164.7716 1050.731 -10347.3 8006.459 
D 305 54.51837 145.818 -0.01382 1451.952 
Et 305 208.2193 436.0296 -65.8871 2575.043 
DEt 305 3.61167 131.1518 -1078.61 974.945 
Ett 305 179.0855 375.721 -57.135 2267.39 
DETt 305 3.203665 116.027 -843.514 982.373 
Met 305 1371.332 2730.07 0 16275.39 
Vt 305 3546.505 7113.137 29.87208 41638.61 
RDt 301 0.308131 1.32307 0 11.1 
RDDt 305 0.836066 0.370825 0 1 
DPt 305 107.4327 249.6192 0 1973.172 
Lt 305 2184.742 4836.663 20.91455 31196.18 
Q 305 839.2143 1753.38 -48.4604 11431.67 
NSt 305 417.1338 702.5543 0 3656.538 
SPt 304 3.06682 3.026376 0 18.39 
LNAt 305 6.5955 1.736628 3.17503 10.66026 
BE 305 852.3228 1763.232 -48.471 10944.19 
DSPt 305 -0.00208 2.143102 -12.465 11.45 
Yt 305 -10.998 1619.648 -9839.27 9494.92 
EttAt 305 0.039631 0.068538 -0.39048 0.36524 
EtAt 305 0.047248 0.07704 -0.38666 0.425889 
VtAt 305 1.195544 0.451481 0.529297 3.559077 
DAtAt 305 0.009155 0.197386 -1.08676 0.726898 
RdtAt 305 0.000526 0.003177 0 0.037809 
DptAt 305 0.028943 0.025544 0 0.178529 
LtVt 305 0.668756 0.204978 0.158789 1.081201 
LtAt 305 0.740074 0.217788 0.39567 2.440831 
Lt1 305 2251.463 5045.329 20.91455 31196.18 
Vt1 305 3631.626 7354.615 28.77579 41638.61 
Dt1 305 55.29464 148.1679 -0.01382 1451.952 
At1 305 3133.514 6799.615 23.92754 42649.9 
Yt1 305 55.38969 1188.658 -9295.9 9494.92 
Et1 305 878.5126 1854.86 -48.4604 11528.56 
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Table VII - Fama and French (2002) Regressions used to understand how Target Pay-Outs behave when they are a function 
of investment opportunities, profitability and volatility proxies. 
Statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Source: Author’s constructions based on Bloomberg database and Fama and French (2002). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
Variables  Vt/At Et/At dAt/At RDDt RDt/At LN(At) Yt1At1 Lt/At Lt/Vt Constant Observations R-squared 
Dt1At1 Regression 1              




      -
14.802 
  -97.413   
Dt1At1 Regression  2             
 Coefficient 0.0130*** 0.0348*** -0.0000 -0.0046* -0.0375 0.0031***    -0.0238*** 305 0.3073 
 Standard deviation -65.937 -28.258 (-0.0010) (-1.7941) 
(-
0.1260) -56.264 
   (-4.5136)   
Dt1At1 Regression 3             
 Coefficient 0.0139*** 0.0252* -0.0010 -0.0048* -0.0658 0.0030*** 
 -0.0071  -0.0184*** 305 0.3126 
 
Standard 
deviation -67.614 -18.207 (-0.2214) (-1.9037) 
(-
0.2214) -54.715 
 (-1.5141)  (-2.9023)   
Dt1At1 Regression 4             




0.0172*** 305 0.3049 
 Standard deviation -79.000 
 (-0.2710) (-2.0610) (-0.2987) -61.039 
 (-2.6350)  (-2.7208)   
Dt1At1 Regression 5             
 Coefficient 0.0116*** 0.0297** -0.0006 -0.0046* -0.0574 0.0031***   -0.0054 -0.0181** 305 0.3090 
 
Standard 
deviation -45.992 -21.713 (-0.1434) (-1.7999) 
(-
0.1923) -55.540 
  (-0.8536) (-2.1195)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)     
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 Coefficient 0.0111***  -0.0010 -0.0049* -0.0887 0.0034***   -0.0114** -0.0139* 305 0.2980 
 Standard deviation -43.945 
 (-0.2143) (-1.9156) (-0.2957) -63.394 
  (-1.9857) (-1.6640)   
 
The Regressions are run for each year during a 10 years period for 41 companies. The table show the coefficients and the t-statistics for the means. The regressions for Target Book Leverage 
is 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 =⁄ 𝑎𝑎0 +  𝑎𝑎1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄ 𝑎𝑎2 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑎𝑎3𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+ 𝑎𝑎4 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄  + 𝑎𝑎5 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) + 𝑎𝑎6 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄  𝑎𝑎7𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +⁄  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 equation (3) page 25, and for Target Market Leverage is  
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Table VIII - Lintner model regression to explain variations in Dividend Targets 
Statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Source: Author’s constructions based on Fama and French (2002) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) (7) 
  
Variables YA DA Daa Lt/At Lt/Vt Constant Observations R-squared SOA  TP 
DDA 
Coefficient 
0.0026 -0.4426*** 0.0041   0.0045*** 305 0.2054 0,4426 0,00587438 
 
Standard Deviation 
(0.8259) (-8.5796) -14.369   -45.691     
DDA 
Coefficient 
0.0024 -0.4545*** 0.0036 -0.0058  0.0089*** 305 0.2107 0,4545 0,00528053 
 
Standard Deviation 
(0.7677) (-8.7120) -12.617 (-1.4271)  -27.656     
DDA 
Coefficient 
-0.0014 -0.5304*** 0.0014  -0.0189*** 0.0181*** 305 0.2433 0,5304 -0,00263952 
  
Standard Deviation 
(-0.4373) (-9.5947) (0.4999)   (-3.8760) -49.851         
 
For this table the used regressions are Market Leverage, which is calculated by (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄ = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎4 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1equation (8) 
page 27, and for Book Leverage, which is: (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1⁄ = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+1 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝑎𝑎4 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴⁄ 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1equation (9) page 28. The speed of adjustment 
(SOA) is the symmetric of the average slope DA, i.e. Dividends at moment t /total Assets at moment t+1. 
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Table IX - Fama and French Regression to understand the behaviour of Book and Market Leverage when they are a function 
of investment opportunities, profitability and volatility proxies 
 
Statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Source: Author’s constructions based on Bloomberg database and Fama and French (2002) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
Variables   Vt/At Et/At DPt/At RDDt RDt/At LN(At) Constant Observations R-squared 
BL Coefficient -0.2492*** -0.9500*** -0.3301 -0.0060 -40.759 -0.0074 1.0769*** 305 0.5591 
 Standard Deviation (-13.5760) (-8.3492) (-1.0204) (-0.2549) (-1.4766) (-1.4517) -222.451   
ML Coefficient 0.1281*** -1.3742*** -0.1605 -0.0412 -42.997 -0.0135** 0.7824*** 305 0.2864 
  
Standard Deviation -51.625 (-8.9350) (-0.3671) (-1.2869) (-1.1524) (-1.9698) -119.561 
    
 
In this table the regressions used for Book Leverage are the following: Lt+1 At+1⁄ = b0 + b1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑏𝑏2 ETt A⁄ t + 𝑏𝑏3 Dpt A⁄ t + b4RDD𝑖𝑖 + b5 RDt A⁄ t + b6Ln(A𝑖𝑖) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 equation (11) 
page 28, and for Market Leverage the Lt+1 Vt+1⁄ = b0 + b1 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝑏𝑏2 ETt A⁄ t + 𝑏𝑏3 Dpt A⁄ t + b4RDD𝑖𝑖 + b5 RDt A⁄ t + b6Ln(A𝑖𝑖) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖+1 equation (12) page 28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
